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Abstract
Reasoning is a crucial part of natural lan-
guage argumentation. To comprehend an argu-
ment, one must analyze its warrant, which ex-
plains why its claim follows from its premises.
As arguments are highly contextualized, war-
rants are usually presupposed and left implicit.
Thus, the comprehension does not only require
language understanding and logic skills, but
also depends on common sense. In this pa-
per we develop a methodology for reconstruct-
ing warrants systematically. We operationalize
it in a scalable crowdsourcing process, result-
ing in a freely licensed dataset with warrants
for 2k authentic arguments from news com-
ments.1 On this basis, we present a new chal-
lenging task, the argument reasoning compre-
hension task. Given an argument with a claim
and a premise, the goal is to choose the cor-
rect implicit warrant from two options. Both
warrants are plausible and lexically close, but
lead to contradicting claims. A solution to this
task will define a substantial step towards auto-
matic warrant reconstruction. However, exper-
iments with several neural attention and lan-
guage models reveal that current approaches
do not suffice.
1 Introduction
Most house cats face enemies. Russia has the op-
posite objectives of the US. There is much innova-
tion in 3-d printing and it is sustainable.
What do the three propositions have in com-
mon? They were never uttered but solely presup-
posed in arguments made by the participants of
online discussions. Presuppositions are a funda-
mental pragmatic instrument of natural language
argumentation in which parts of arguments are left
unstated. This phenomenon is also referred to as
1Available at https://github.com/UKPLab/
argumentreasoning-comprehension-task/, including
source codes and supplementary materials.
common knowledge (Macagno and Walton, 2014,
p. 218), enthymemes (Walton, 2007b, p. 12),
tacit major premises (Amossy, 2009, p. 319), or
implicit warrants (Newman and Marshall, 1991,
p. 8). Wilson and Sperber (2004) suggest that,
when we comprehend arguments, we reconstruct
their warrants driven by the cognitive principle of
relevance. In other words, we go straight for the
interpretation that seems most relevant and logi-
cal within the given context (Hobbs et al., 1993).
Although any incomplete argument can be com-
pleted in different ways (Plumer, 2016), it is as-
sumed that certain knowledge is shared between
the arguing parties (Macagno and Walton, 2014,
p. 180).
Filling the gap between the claim and premises
(aka reasons) of a natural language argument em-
pirically remains an open issue, due to the inher-
ent difficulty of reconstructing the world knowl-
edge and reasoning patterns in arguments. In a di-
rect fashion, Boltuzˇic´ and Sˇnajder (2016) let an-
notators write down implicit warrants, but they
concluded only with a preliminary analysis due
to large variance in the responses. In an indi-
rect fashion, implicit warrants correspond to ma-
jor premises in argumentation schemes; a concept
heavily referenced in argumentation theory (Wal-
ton, 2012). However, mapping schemes to real-
world arguments has turned out difficult even for
the author himself.
Our main hypothesis is that, even if there is no
limit to the tacit length of the reasoning chain be-
tween claims and premises, it is possible to sys-
tematically reconstruct a meaningful warrant, de-
pending only on what we take as granted and what
needs to be explicit. As warrants encode our cur-
rent presupposed world knowledge and connect
the reason with the claim in a given argument, we
expect that other warrants can be found which con-
nect the reason with a different claim. In the ex-
Title: Is Marijuana a Gateway Drug? Description: Does us-
ing marijuana lead to the use of more dangerous drugs, mak-
ing it too dangerous to legalize?
Reason: Milk isn’t a gateway drug even though most peo-
ple drink it as children. And since {Warrant 1 | Warrant 2},
Claim: Marijuana is not a gateway drug.
4 Warrant 1: milk is similar to marijuana
7 Warrant 2: milk is not marijuana
Figure 1: Instance of the argument reasoning compre-
hension task. The correct warrant has to be identified.
Notice the fallacious presupposed false analogy used
by the author to make the argument.
treme case, there may exist an alternative warrant
in which the same reason is connected to the op-
posite claim.
The intuition of alternative warrants is key to the
systematic methodology that we develop in this
paper for reconstructing a warrant for the original
claim of an argument. In particular, we first ‘twist’
the stance of a given argument, trying to plausibly
explain its reasoning towards the opposite claim.
Then, we twist the stance back and use a similar
reasoning chain to come up with a warrant for the
original argument. As we discuss further below,
this works for real-world arguments with a miss-
ing piece of information that is taken for granted
and considered as common knowledge, yet, would
lead to the opposite stance if twisted.
We demonstrate the applicability of our
methodology in a large crowdsourcing study. The
study results in 1,970 high-quality instances for a
new task that we call argument reasoning com-
prehension: Given a reason and a claim, identify
the correct warrant from two opposing options.
An example is given in Figure 1. A solution to
this task will represent a substantial step towards
automatic warrant reconstruction. However, we
present experiments with several neural attention
and language models which reveal that current ap-
proaches based on the words and phrases in argu-
ments and warrants do not suffice to solve the task.
The main contributions of this paper are (1) a
methodology for obtaining implicit warrants real-
ized by means of scalable crowdsourcing and (2)
a new task along with a high-quality dataset. In
addition, we provide (a) 2,884 user-generated ar-
guments annotated for their stance, covering 50+
controversial topics, (b) 2,026 arguments with an-
notated reasons supporting the stance, (c) 4,235
rephrased reason gists, useful for argument sum-
marization and sentence compression, and (d) a
method for checking the reliability of crowdwork-
ers in document and span labeling using traditional
inter-annotator agreement measures.
2 Related Work
It is widely accepted that an argument consists of a
claim and one or more premises (reasons) (Damer,
2013). Toulmin (1958) elaborated on a model of
argument in which the reason supports the claim
on behalf of a warrant. The abstract structure of
an argument then is Reason→ (since) Warrant→
(therefore) Claim. The warrant takes the role of
an inference rule, similar to the major premise in
Walton’s terminology (Walton, 2007a).
In principle, the chain Reason → Warrant →
Claim is applicable to deductive arguments and
syllogisms, which allows us to validate arguments
properly formalized in propositional logic. How-
ever, most natural language arguments are in fact
inductive (Govier, 2010, p. 255) or defeasible
(Walton, 2007b, p. 29).2 Accordingly, the unsuit-
ability of formal logic for natural language argu-
ments has been discussed by argumentation schol-
ars since the 1950’s (Toulmin, 1958). To be clear,
we do not claim that arguments cannot be rep-
resented logically (e.g., in predicate logic), how-
ever the drift to informal logic in the 20th cen-
tury makes a strong case that natural language
argumentation is more than modus ponens (van
Eemeren et al., 2014).
In argumentation theory, the notion of a war-
rant has also been contentious. Some argue that
the distinction of warrants from premises is clear
only in Toulmin’s examples but fails in practice,
i.e., it is hard to tell whether the reason of a given
argument is a premise or a warrant (van Eemeren
et al., 1987, p. 205). However, Freeman (2011)
provides alternative views on modeling an argu-
ment. Given a claim and two or more premises, the
argument structure is linked if the reasoning step
involves the logical conjunction of the premises.
If we treat a warrant as a simple premise, then the
linked structure fits the intuition behind Toulmin’s
model, such that premise and warrant combined
give support to the claim. For details, see (Free-
man, 2011, Chap. 4).
2A recent empirical example is provided by Walker et al.
(2014) who propose possible approaches to identify patterns
of inference from premises to claims in vaccine court cases.
The authors conclude that it is extremely rare that a reasoning
is explicitly laid out in a deductively valid format.
What makes comprehending and analyzing ar-
guments hard is that claims and warrants are usu-
ally implicit (Freeman, 2011, p. 82). As they are
‘taken for granted’ by the arguer, the reader has
to infer the contextually most relevant content that
she believes the arguer intended to use. To this
end, the reader relies on common sense knowledge
(Oswald, 2016; Wilson and Sperber, 2004).
The reconstruction of implicit premises has al-
ready been faced in computational approaches. In
light of the design of their argument diagramming
tool, Reed and Rowe (2004) pointed out that the
automatic reconstruction is a task that skilled an-
alysts find both taxing and hard to explain. More
recently, Feng and Hirst (2011) as well as Green
(2014) outlined the reconstruction of missing en-
thymemes or warrants as future work, but they
never approached it since. To date, the most ad-
vanced attempt in this regard is from Boltuzˇic´ and
Sˇnajder (2016). The authors let annotators ‘re-
construct’ several propositions between premises
and claims and investigated whether the number
of propositions correlates with the semantic dis-
tance between the claim and the premises. How-
ever, they conclude that the written warrants heav-
ily vary both in depth and in content. By contrast,
we explore cases with a missing single piece of
information that is considered as common knowl-
edge, yet leading to the opposite conclusion if
twisted. Recently, Becker et al. (2017) also exper-
imented with reconstructing implicit knowledge in
short German argumentative essays. In contrast to
our work, they used expert annotators who itera-
tively converged to a single proposition.
As the task we propose involves natural lan-
guage comprehension, we also review relevant
work outside argumentation here. In particular,
the goal of the semantic inference task textual en-
tailment is to classify whether a proposition entails
or contradicts a hypothesis (Dagan et al., 2009).
A similar task, natural language inference, was
boosted by releasing the large SNLI dataset (Bow-
man et al., 2015) containing 0.5M entailment pairs
crowdsourced by describing pictures. While the
understanding of semantic inference is crucial in
language comprehension, argumentation also re-
quires coping with phenomena beyond semantics.
Rajpurkar et al. (2016) presented a large dataset
for reading comprehension by answering ques-
tions over Wikipedia articles (SQuAD). In an anal-
ysis of this dataset Sugawara and Aizawa (2016)
found, though, that only 6.2% of the questions
require causal reasoning, 1.2% logical reasoning,
and 0% analogy. In contrast, these reasoning types
often make up the core of argumentation (Walton,
2007a). Mostafazadeh et al. (2016) introduced the
cloze story test, in which the appropriate ending of
a narrative has to be selected automatically. The
overall context of this task is completely differ-
ent to ours. Moreover, the narratives were writ-
ten from scratch by explicitly instructing crowd
workers, whereas our data come from genuine ar-
gumentative comments. Common-sense reason-
ing was also approached by Angeli and Manning
(2014) who targeted the inference of common-
sense facts from a large knowledge base. Since
their logical formalism builds upon an enhanced
version of Aristotle’s syllogisms, its applicability
to natural language argumentation remains limited
(see our discussion above). In contrast to our data
source, a few synthetic datasets for general natu-
ral language reasoning have been recently intro-
duced, such as answers to questions over a de-
scribed physical world (Weston et al., 2016) or an
evaluation set of 100 questions in the Winograd
Schema Challenge (Levesque et al., 2012).
Finally, we note that, although being related, re-
search on argument mining, argumentation qual-
ity, and stance classification is not in the imme-
diate scope of this paper. For details on these,
we therefore refer to recent papers from Lippi and
Torroni (2016); Habernal and Gurevych (2017) or
Mohammad et al. (2016).
3 Argument Reasoning Comprehension
Let R be a reason for a claim C, both of which be-
ing propositions extracted from a natural language
argument. Then there is a warrant W that justi-
fies the use of R as support for C, but W is left
implicit.
For example, in a discussion about whether de-
clawing a cat should be illegal, an author takes
the following position (which is her claim C): ‘It
should be illegal to declaw your cat’. She gives
the following reason (R): ‘They need to use their
claws for defense and instinct’.3 The warrant W
could then be ‘If cat needs claws for instincts, de-
clawing would be against nature’ or similar. W re-
mains implicit, because R already implies C quite
obviously and so, according to common sense, any
further explanation seems superfluous.
3The example is taken from our dataset introduced below.
Now, the question is how to find the warrant W
for a given reason R and claim C. Our key hy-
pothesis in the definition of the argument reason-
ing comprehension task is the existence of an al-
ternative warrant AW that justifies the use of R as
support for the opposite ¬C of the claim C (regard-
less of the question of how strong this justification
is).
For the example above, assume that we ‘twist’
C to ‘It should be legal to declaw your cat’ (¬C)
but use the same reason R. Is it possible to come
up with an alternative warrant AW that justifies R?
In the given case, ‘most house cats don’t face en-
emies’ would bridge R to ¬C quite plausibly. If
we now use a reasoning based on AW but twist
AW again such that it leads to the claim C, we get
‘most house cats face enemies’, which is a plausi-
ble warrant W for the original argument containing
R and C. 4
Constructing an alternative warrant is not pos-
sible for all reason/claim pairs; in some reasons
the arguer’s position is deeply embedded. As a
result, trying to give a plausible reasoning for the
opposite claim ¬C either leads to nonsense or to a
proposition that resembles a rebuttal rather than a
warrant (Toulmin, 1958). However, if both W and
AW are available, they usually capture the core of a
reason’s relevance and reveal the implicit presup-
positions (examples follow further below).
Based on our key hypothesis, we define the ar-
gument reasoning comprehension task as:
Given a reason R and a claim C along with the
title and a short description of the debate they oc-
cur in, identify the correct warrant W from two
candidates: the correct warrant W and an incor-
rect alternative warrant AW.
An instance of the task is thus basically given
by a tuple (R,C,W,AW ). The debate title and de-
scription serve as the context of R and C. As it is
binary, we propose to evaluate the task using ac-
curacy.
4 Reconstruction of Implicit Warrants
We now describe our methodology to systemati-
cally reconstruct implicit warrants, along with the
scalable crowdsourcing process that operational-
izes the methodology. The result of the process is
4This way, we also reveal the weakness of the original ar-
gument that was hidden in the implicit premise. It can be
challenged by asking the arguer whether house cats really
face enemies.
a dataset with authentic instances (R,C,W,AW ) of
the argument reasoning comprehension task.
4.1 Source Data
Instead of extending an existing dataset, we de-
cided to create a new one from scratch, because
we aimed to study a variety of controversial issues
in user-generated web comments and because we
sought for a dataset with a permissive license.
As a source, we opted for the Room for De-
bate section of the New York Times.5 It pro-
vides authentic argumentation on contemporary
issues with good editorial work and moderation
— as opposed to debate portals such as createde-
bate.com, where classroom assignments, silly top-
ics, and bad writing prevail. We manually selected
188 debates with polar questions in the title. These
questions are controversial and provoking, giving
a stimulus for stance-taking and argumentation.6
For each debate we created two explicit opposing
claims, e.g., ‘It should be illegal to declaw your
cat’ and ‘It should be legal to declaw your cat’.
We crawled all comments from each debate and
sampled about 11k high-ranked, root-level com-
ments.7
4.2 Methodology and Crowdsourcing Process
The methodology we propose consists of eight
consecutive steps that are illustrated in Figure 2
and detailed below. Each step can be operational-
ized with crowdsourcing. For our dataset, we per-
formed crowdsourcing on 5,000 randomly sam-
pled comments using Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) from December 2016 to April 2017. Be-
fore, each comment was split into elementary dis-
course units (EDUs) using SistaNLP (Surdeanu
et al., 2015).
1. Stance Annotation For each comment, we
first classify what stance it is taking (recall that
we always have two explicit claims with opposing
stance). Alternatively, it may be neutral (consider-
5https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate
6Detailed theoretical research on polar and alternative
questions can be found in (van Rooy and Sˇafa´rˇova´, 2003);
Asher and Reese (2005) analyze bias and presupposition in
polar questions.
7To remove ‘noisy’ candidates, we applied several crite-
ria, such as the absence of quotations or URLs and certain
lengths. For details, see the source code we provide. We did
not check any quality criteria of arguments, as this was not
our focus; see, e.g., (Wachsmuth et al., 2017) for argumenta-
tion quality.
Figure 2: Overview of the methodology of reconstructing implicit warrants for argument reasoning comprehension.
ing both sides) or may not take any stance.8
All 2,884 comments in our dataset classified as
stance-taking by the crowdworkers were then also
annotated as to whether being sarcastic or ironic;
both pose challenges in analyzing argumentation
not solved so far (Habernal and Gurevych, 2017).
2. Reason Span Annotation For all comments
taking a stance, the next step is to select those
spans that give a reason for the claim (with a single
EDU as the minimal unit).
In our dataset, the workers found 5,119 rea-
son spans, of which 2,026 lay within arguments.
About 40 comments lacked any explicit reason.
3. Reason Gist Summarization This new task
is, in our view, crucial for downstream annota-
tions. Each reason from the previous step is rewrit-
ten, such that the reason’s gist in the argument re-
mains the same but the clutter is removed (exam-
ples are given in the supplementary material which
is available both in the ACL Anthology and the
project GitHub site). Besides, wrongly annotated
reasons are removed in this step. The result is pairs
of reason R and claim C.
All 4,294 gists in our dataset were summarized
under Creative Commons Zero license (CC-0).
4. Reason Disambiguation Within our method-
ology, we need to be able to identify to what ex-
tent a reason itself implies a stance: While ‘C be-
cause R’ allows for many plausible interpretations
(as discussed above), whether R→ C or R→ ¬C
depends on how much presupposition is encoded
in R. In this step, we decide which claim (C or
¬C) is most plausible for R, or whether both are
8We also experimented with approaching the annotations
top-down starting by annotating explicit claims, but the re-
sults were unsatisfying. This is in line with empirical obser-
vations made by Habernal and Gurevych (2017) who showed
that the majority of claims in user-generated arguments are
implicit.
similarly plausible (in the given data, respective
reasons turned out to be rather irrelevant though).
We used only those 1,955 instances where R in-
deed implied C according to the workers, as this
suggests at least some implicit presupposition in
R.
5. Alternative Warrant This step is the trick-
iest, since it requires both creativity and ‘brain
twisting’. As exemplified in Section 3, a plausible
explanation needs to be given why R supports ¬C
(i.e., the alternative warrant AW ). Alternatively,
this may be classified as being impossible.
Exact instructions for our workers can be found
in the provided sources. All 5,342 alternative war-
rants in our dataset are written under CC-0 license.
6. Alternative Warrant Validation As the pre-
vious step produces largely uncontrolled writings,
we validate each fabricated alternative warrant AW
as to whether it actually relates to the reason R. To
this end, we show AW and ¬C together with two
alternatives: R itself and a distracting reason. Only
instances with correctly validated R are kept.
For our dataset, we sampled the distracting rea-
son from the same debate topic, using the most
dissimilar to R in terms of skip-thought vectors
(Kiros et al., 2015) and cosine similarity. We
kept 3,791 instances, for which the workers also
rated how ‘logical’ the explanation of AW was (0–
2 scale).
7. Warrant For Original Claim This step
refers to the second task in the example from Sec-
tion 3: Given R and C, make minimal modifi-
cations to the alternative warrant AW , such that
it becomes an actual warrant W (i.e., such that
R→W →C).
For our dataset, we restricted this step to those
2,613 instances that had a ‘logic score’ of at least
0.68 (obtained from the annotations mentioned
above), in order to filter out nonsense alternative
warrants. All resulting 2,447 warrants were writ-
ten by the workers again under CC0 license.
8. Warrant Validation To ensure that each tuple
(R,C,W,AW ) allows only one logical explanation
(i.e., either R→W→C or R→AW→C is correct,
not both), all instances are validated again.
Disputed cases in the dataset (according to our
workers) were fixed by an expert to ensure quality.
We ended up with 1,970 instances to be used for
the argument reasoning comprehension task.
4.3 Agreement and Dataset Statistics
To strictly assess quality in the entire crowdsourc-
ing process, we propose an evaluation method that
enables ‘classic’ inter-annotator agreement mea-
sures for crowdsourcing, such as Fleiss’ κ or
Krippendorff’s α . Applying κ and α directly to
crowdsourced data has been disputed (Passonneau
and Carpenter, 2014). For estimating gold labels
from the crowd, several models have been pro-
posed; we rely on MACE (Hovy et al., 2013).
Given a number of noisy workers, MACE out-
puts best estimates, outperforming simple major-
ity votes. At least five workers are recommended
for a crowdsourcing task, but how reliable is the
output really?
We hence collected 18 assignments per item and
split them into two groups (9+9) based on their
submission time. We then considered each group
as an independent crowdsourcing experiment and
estimated gold labels using MACE for each group,
thus yielding two ‘experts from the crowd.’ Hav-
ing two independent ‘experts’ from the crowd al-
lowed us to compute standard agreement scores.
We also varied the size of the sub-sample from
each group from 1 to 9 by repeated random sam-
pling of assignments. This revealed how the score
varies with respect to the crowd size per ‘expert’.
Figure 3 shows the Cohen’s κ agreement for
stance annotation with respect to the crowd size
computed by our method. As MACE also includes
a threshold for keeping only the most confident
predictions in order to benefit precision, we tuned
this parameter, too. Deciding on the number of
workers per task is a trade-off between the desired
quality and the budget. For example, reason span
annotation is a harder task; however, the results for
six workers are comparable to those for the expert
annotations of Habernal and Gurevych (2017).9
9The supplementary material contains a detailed figure;
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Figure 3: Cohen’s κ agreement for stance annotation
on 98 comments. As a trade-off between reducing costs
(i.e., discarding fewer instances) and increasing relia-
bility, we chose 5 annotators and a threshold of 0.95
for this task, which resulted in κ = 0.58 (moderate to
substantial agreement).
Table 1 lists statistics of the entire crowdsourc-
ing process carried out for our dataset, including
tasks for which we created data as a by-product.
4.4 Examples
Below, we show three examples in which implicit
common-sense presuppositions were revealed dur-
ing the construction of the alternative warrant AW
and the original warrant W . For brevity, we omit
the debate title and description here. A full walk-
through example is found in the supplementary
material.
R: Cooperating with Russia on terrorism ignores Russia’s
overall objectives.
C: Russia cannot be a partner.
AW : Russia has the same objectives of the US.
W : Russia has the opposite objectives of the US.
R: Economic growth needs innovation.
C: 3-D printing will change the world.
AW : There is no innovation in 3-d printing since it’s unsus-
tainable.
W : There is much innovation in 3-d printing and it is sus-
tainable.
R: College students have the best chance of knowing his-
tory.
C: College students’ votes do matter in an election.
AW : Knowing history doesn’t mean that we will repeat it.
W : Knowing history means that we won’t repeat it.
5 Experiments
Given the dataset, we performed first experiments
to assess the complexity of argument reasoning
comprehension. To this end, we split the 1,970 in-
stances into three sets based on the year of the de-
not to be confused with Figure 3 which refers to stance anno-
tation.
# Methodology Step Input Sata Size Output Data Size Quality Assurance Use of Data
1 Stance annotation Comment, topic 5,000 Stance-taking
arguments
2,884 Cohen’s κ 0.58 Argument stance
detection; sarcastic
argument detection
2 Reason span annotation Stance-taking argument 2,884 Reason spans (in
arguments)
5,119
(2,026)
Krippendorff’s αu 0.51 Argument component
detection; argumentative
text segmentation
3 Reason gist
summarization
Claim, reason span 5,119 Summarized reason
gists (in arguments)
4,294
(1,927)
Qualified workers,
manual inspection
Abstractive argument
summarization; reason
clustering; empirical
analysis of controversies
4 Reason disambiguation Reason gist, both claims 4,235 Reasons implying
original stance
1,955 Cohen’s κ 0.42
(task-important
categories)
Argument component
stance detection
5 Writing alternative
warrant
Reason gist, opposing
claim
1,955 Fabricated warrant for
reason and opposing
claim
5,342 Qualified workers,
manual inspection
–
6 Alternative warrant
validation
Opposing claim,
alternative warrant,
reason, distracting
reason
5,342 Plausible triple of
reason, alternative
warrant, and opposing
claim
3,791 – Reason/Warrant
relevance detection
7 Writing warrant for
original claim
Claim, reason,
alternative warrant
2,613* Warrant similar to
alternative warrant for
reason and claim
2,447 Qualified workers,
manual inspection
–
8 Warrant validation Claim, reason, warrant,
alternative warrant
2,447 Validated triple of
reason, warrant, and
claim
1,970 Qualified workers,
experts for hard cases
Argument reasoning
comprehension (our
main task)
Table 1: Details and statistics of the datasets resulting from the eight steps of our methodology implemented in
a crowdsourcing process. *Input instances were filtered by their ‘logic score’ assigned in Step 6, such that the
weakest 30% were discarded. A more detailed description is available in the readme file of the source code.
bate they were taken from: 2011–2015 became the
training set (1,210 instances), 2016 the develop-
ment set (316 instances), and 2017 the test set (444
instances). This follows the paradigm of learning
on past data and predicting on new ones. In addi-
tion, it removes much lexical and topical overlap.
5.1 Human Upper Bounds
To evaluate human upper bounds for the task, we
sampled 100 random questions (such as those pre-
sented in Section 4.4) from the test set and dis-
tributed them among 173 participants of an AMT
survey. Every participant had to answer 10 ques-
tions. We also asked the participants about their
highest completed education (six categories) and
the amount of formal training they have in rea-
soning, logic, or argumentation (no training, some,
or extensive). In addition, they specified for each
question how familiar they were with the topic (3-
point scale).
How Hard is the Task for Humans? It de-
pends, as shown in Figure 4. Whereas educa-
tion had almost negligible influence on the perfor-
mance, the more extensive formal training in rea-
soning the participants had, the higher their score
was. Overall, 30 of the 173 participants scored
100%. The mean score for those with extensive
1
12
29
7
30
8
2
19 7 39
8
2
1 5 3
<Hg
h. s.
 deg
.
High
 scho
ol de
gree
Colle
ge (n
o de
gree
)
Asso
ciate
 deg
ree
Bach
elor 
degr
ee
Grad
uate
 deg
ree+
70%
80%
90%
100%
Ac
cu
ra
cy
No training Some training Extensive
Figure 4: Human upper bounds on the argument rea-
soning comprehension task with respect to education
and formal training in reasoning, logic, or argumenta-
tion. For each configuration, the mean values are dis-
played together with the number of participants (above
the bar) and with their standard deviations (error bars).
formal training was 90.9%. For all participants,
the mean was 79.8%. However, we have to note
that some of the questions are more difficult than
others, for which we could not control explicitly.
Does Topic Familiarity Affect Human Perfor-
mance? Not really, i.e., we found no significant
(Spearman) correlation between the mean score
and familiarity of a participant in almost all educa-
tion/training configurations. This suggests that ar-
gument reasoning comprehension skills are likely
to be independent of topic-specific knowledge.
5.2 Computational Models
To assess the complexity of computationally ap-
proaching argument reasoning comprehension, we
carried out first experiments with systems based
on the following models.
The simplest considered model was the random
baseline, which chooses either of the candidate
warrants of an instance by chance. As another
baseline, we used a 4-gram Modified Kneser-Ney
language model trained on 500M tokens (100k
vocabulary) from the C4Corpus (Habernal et al.,
2016). The effectiveness of language models was
demonstrated by Rudinger et al. (2015) for the
narrative cloze test where they achieved state-of-
the-art results. We computed log-likelihood of the
candidate warrants and picked the one with lower
score.10
To specifically appoach the given task, we im-
plemented two neural models based on a bidirec-
tional LSTM. In the standard attention version,
we encoded the reason and claim using a BiL-
STM and provided it as an attention vector after
max-pooling to LSTM layers from the two avail-
able warrants W0 and W1 (corresponding to W and
AW , see below). Our more elaborated version
used intra-warrant attention, as shown in Figure
5. Both versions were also extended with the de-
bate title and description added as context to the
attention layer (w/ context). We trained the re-
sulting four models using the ADAM optimizer,
with heavy dropout (0.9) and early stopping (5
epochs), tuned on the development set. Input em-
beddings were pre-trained word2vec’s (Mikolov
et al., 2013). We ran each model three times with
random initializations.
To evaluate all systems, each instance in our
dataset is represented as a tuple (R,C,W0,W1) with
a label (0 or 1). If the label is 0, W0 is the cor-
rect warrant, otherwise W1. Recall that we have
two warrants W and AW whose correctness de-
pends on the claim: W is correct for R and the
original claim C, whereas AW would be correct
for R and the opposite claim ¬C. We thus dou-
bled the training data by adding a permuted in-
stance (R,C,W1,W0) with the respective correct la-
bel; this led to increased performance. The overall
10This might seem counterintuitive, but since W is cre-
ated by rewriting AW , it may suffer from some dis-coherency,
which is then caught by the language model.
Figure 5: Intra-warrant attention. Only the attention
vector for the warrant W1 is shown; the attention vector
for W0 is constructed analogously. Grey areas represent
a modification with additional context.
results of all approaches (humans and systems) are
shown in Table 2. Intra-warrant attention with rich
context outperforms standard neural models with a
simple attention, but it only slightly beats the lan-
guage model on the dev set. The language model
is basically random on the test set.
A manual error analysis of 50 random wrong
predictions (a single run of the best-performing
system on the dev set) revealed no explicit pattern
of encountered errors. Drawing any conclusions is
hard given the diversity of included topics and the
variety of reasoning patterns. A possible approach
would be to categorize warrants using, e.g., argu-
mentation schemes (Walton et al., 2008) and break
down errors accordingly. However, this is beyond
the scope here and thus left for future work.
Can We Benefit from Alternative Warrants and
Opposite Claims? Since the reasoning chain
R→AW→¬C is correct, too, we also tried adding
respective instances to the training set (thus dou-
bling the size). In this configuration, however, the
neural models failed to learn anything better than a
random guess. The reason behind is probably that
the opposing claims are lexically very close, usu-
ally negated, and the models cannot pick this up.
This underlines that argument reasoning compre-
hension cannot be solved by simply looking at the
occurring words or phrases.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
We presented a new task called argument reason-
ing comprehension that tackles the core of rea-
soning in natural language argumentation — im-
Approach Dev (±) Test (±)
Human average .798 .162
Human w/ training in reasoning .909 .114
Random baseline .473 .039 .491 .031
Language model .617 .500
Attention .488 .006 .513 .012
Attention w/ context .502 .031 .512 .014
Intra-warrant attention .638 .024 .556 .016
Intra-warrant attent. w/ context .637 .040 .560 .055
Table 2: Accuracy of each approach (humans and sys-
tems) on the development set and test set, respectively.
plicit warrants. Moreover, we proposed a method-
ology to systematically reconstruct implicit war-
rants in eight consecutive steps. So far, we imple-
mented the methodology in a manual crowdsourc-
ing process, along with a strategy that enables
standard inter-annotator agreement measures in
crowdsourcing.
Following the process, we constructed a new
dataset with 1,970 instances for the task. This
number might not seem large (e.g., compared to
0.5M from SNLI), but tasks with hand-crafted
data are of a similar size (e.g., 3,744 Story Cloze
Test instances). Also, the crowdsourcing pro-
cess is scalable and is limited only by the bud-
get.11 Moreover, we created several data ‘by-
products’ that are valuable for argumentation re-
search: 5,000 comments annotated with stance,
which outnumbers the 4,163 tweets for stance de-
tection of Mohammad et al. (2016); 2,026 argu-
ments with 4,235 annotated reasons, which is six
times larger than the 340 documents of Habernal
and Gurevych (2017); and 4,235 summarized rea-
son gists — we are not aware of any other hand-
crafted dataset for abstractive argument summa-
rization built upon authentic arguments.
Based on the dataset, we evaluated human per-
formance in argument reasoning comprehension.
Our findings suggest that the task is harder for peo-
ple without formal argumentation training, while
being solvable without knowing the topic. We also
found that neural attention models outperform lan-
guage models on the task.
In the short run, we plan to draw more attention
to this topic by running a SemEval 2018 shared
task.12 A deep qualitative analysis of the war-
rants from the theoretical perspective of reasoning
11In our case, the total costs were about $6,000 including
bonuses and experiments with the workflow set-up.
12https://competitions.codalab.org/
competitions/17327
patterns or argumentation schemes is also neces-
sary. In the long run, an automatic generation and
validation warrants can be understood as the ul-
timate goal in argument evaluation. It has been
claimed that for reconstructing and evaluating nat-
ural language arguments, one has to fully ‘roll out’
their implicit premises (van Eemeren et al., 2014,
Chap. 3.2) and leverage knowledge bases (Wyner
et al., 2016). We believe that a system that can
distinguish between the wrong and the right war-
rant given its context will be helpful in filtering out
good candidates in argument reconstruction.
For the moment, we just made a first empirical
step towards exploring how much common-sense
reasoning is necessary in argumentation and how
much common sense there might be at all.
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